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Helfstein v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 91 (Dec. 3, 2015)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court determined that the six-month deadline to set aside a voluntary 
dismissal or settlement agreement found within NRCP 60(b) could not be extended, despite an 
allegation of fraud. 
 
Background 
 
 Ira Seaver, the Ira Seaver and Edythe Seaver Family Trust, and Circle Consulting 
Corporation (collectively Seaver) sued Lewis and Madalyn Helfstein, Summit Laser Products, 
Inc., and Summit Technologies, LLC (collectively, Helfstein) and Uninet Imaging, Inc., and 
Nestor Saporiti (collectively Uninet) in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court. Amongst the 
charges, Seaver claimed a series of contract and tort-based causes of action arising out of 
agreements after Uninet purchased the Helfsteins’ Summit companies.  
 The Helfsteins settled with Seaver (before answering the complaint) and in return, Seaver 
voluntarily dismissed the Helfsteins. Fourteen months later, Seaver filed a notice of rescission, 
alleging they were fraudulently induced to settle. Additionally, Seaver alleged the Helfsteins failed 
in their fiduciary and discovery duties when they failed to adequately produce relevant documents 
or inform them of material facts. 
 Without the Helfsteins as a party to the litigation, Seaver and Uninet proceeded to a bench 
trial. One year after the trial (and twenty-six months after filing the notice of rescission), Seaver 
filed a NRCP 60(b) motion in an attempt to set aside the settlement agreement. After a series of 
motions the district court ordered an evidentiary hearing. After the evidentiary hearing, the 
Helfsteins filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the NRCP 60(b) motion was improper. After that 
motion was denied, the Helfsteins appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The purpose of NRCP Rule 60(b) is “to redress any injustices that may have resulted 
because of excusable neglect or the wrongs of an opposing party.”2 However, within the 
aforementioned rule, is a six-month time period to challenge any judgment, order or proceeding.3 
That period was set and “represents the extreme limit of reasonableness.”4 
 Here, Seaver did not file his NRCP 60(b) motion until forty months after settling with— 
and voluntarily dismissing— Helfstein. While the NRCP 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal is a “final 
judgment, order, or proceeding”5 that may be set aside under NRCP 60(b), Seaver’s request is 
time-barred because he made the request after the six-month time limit passed.  
 
                                                     
1  By Heather Caliguire 
2  Nev. Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Benedetti, 103 Nev. 360, 364, 741 P.2d 802, 805 (1987). 
3  Union Petrochemical Corp. of Nev. v. Scott, 96 Nev. 337. 338-39, 609 P.2d 323-24 (1980).  
4  Stoecklein v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 109 Nev. 268, 272, 849 P.2d 305, 308 (1993). 
5  NEV. R. CIV. P. § 60(b). 
Conclusion 
 
 The six-month time limit to set-aside a voluntary dismissal cannot be extended. The district 
court erred in ordering the evidentiary hearing as the 60(b) motion was brought too late, and thus 
was time-barred.  
 
